Belichick did have his reasons
Analysis
This is not a defense of what Bill Belichick did. Clearly, most coaches--virtually all coaches--would have opted to punt the ball on fourth and two with about two minutes to play, protecting a 34-28 lead.
The bottom-line analysis here is that Belichick probably was wrong. He probably made a desperation coaching move in a circumstance that didn't call for it. He probably should have given his Patriots defense a chance to stop Peyton Manning and the Colts. The New England defense had managed to do that a few times during the game, after all. It even did it once in the fourth quarter when Manning threw his second interception of the night.
But the other point here is that it's not quite as clear-cut as some are making it out to be that Belichick was wrong.
There are reasons for what he did.
First of all, Belichick coaches that way. He takes chances. He leaves his offense on the field for fourth-down gambles. He trusts Tom Brady implicitly.
Whatever you think of Belichick and his methods, the guy has won three Super Bowls with the Patriots. He has some idea what he's doing.
Clearly, in this circumstance, Belichick thought his defense was done and had no chance of stopping Manning whether the Colts got the ball at the 28-yard line, midfield, their own 2-yard line or out in the parking lot. The Colts already had crafted a pair of 79-yard touchdown drives in the fourth quarter. One lasted 2 minutes 4 seconds. The other lasted 1 minute 49 seconds.
In fact, here's where Belichick was inconsistent: If he really thought his defense couldn't win the game for him, if he really thought his only chance was with Brady and his offense, shouldn't the Patriots have followed the failed fourth-down gamble by allowing the Colts to score a touchdown immediately? That way, the Patriots would have faced a 35-34 deficit but they would have had nearly two minutes to try to drive to a game-winning field goal of their own. As it was, the Colts scored the winning points with 13 seconds left and Brady had no time for a reply.
One thing that Belichick did accomplish was putting the postgame focus entirely on himself. No one is talking about the Patriots' defensive struggles in the fourth quarter. If the Patriots have to go to Indianapolis again during the postseason, all of the talk during the buildup to that game will be about Belichick's fourth-down gamble that failed.
He has, in a strange way, taken the pressure off his players, who undoubtedly believe very strongly that they could beat the Colts in a possible rematch no matter where it would be played.
By
Mark Maske
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November 16, 2009; 11:15 AM ET
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Analysis
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Colts
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Posted by: Here2day | November 24, 2009 3:50 PM
Maybe Belichick was concerned that without the ability to steal signs, he could not longer trust his defense. After all, he has not won a super bowl since he has been outed. A cheater gets what he deserves.
Posted by: velocity1 | November 19, 2009 10:42 PM
Whats shocking about this analysis...and literally almost all the analysis on this from mainstream commenters is how little understanding of basic probability theory is encompassed in it...
"Clearly, in this circumstance, Belichick thought his defense was done and had no chance of stopping Manning whether the Colts got the ball at the 28-yard line, midfield, their own 2-yard line or out in the parking lot."
Where does this sort of stuff come from? I really don't get it.
Why not actually run through the numbers with realistic probabilities attached?
Advancednflstats.com gives some stronger stats based on NFL history. I'll use round numbers to make this simple.
Belichick thought the offense had a 50% chance of converting. He thought if they didn't convert, they had a 50% chance of stopping the Colts from the 28. Combined the probability of losing when going was 25%. He thought the prob of losing when punting was 30%.
25%
Going gave a higher probability of winning.
How do you get from that to "clearly Belichick thought his defense was doomed no matter where they were". I really don't get this.
You can play with the numbers a bit. Clearly 50%/50%/30% was heavily rounded, but the bottom line is he had confidence in both the offense and defense.
Posted by: jeffreyclarke | November 17, 2009 3:18 AM
faulk bobbled the ball. he makes a clean catch, they win. belichick gambled and lost. lets move on...
Posted by: funkey | November 16, 2009 2:50 PM
Belichick made a bold move and it failed. actually if he would have had a challenge left, it may have shown that they did indeed pick-up a first down. The ball was caught and he came down over the first down marker but was hit backward. They should have stretched this out a few more yards ont he reception, then there would not have been any doubt. Belichick has not put all the blame on himself, so in a way his players are protected, he is a smart coach and it is rare to beat him twice in the same year. He has a plan, you better believe it, the league has been put on notice, the Patriots will be rolling along right into the superbowl!
Posted by: lvdave | November 16, 2009 1:21 PM
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I've been thinking about how to show that Belichick was right in going for it in the Colt game. Look at it this way: . The odds of making those two yards are 68 percent for it, thereby giving the Colts a 32 percent chance of being on the thirty-yardline. The odds that Peyton Manning (one of the greatest QB's of all time) and the Colts will drive against a depleated gassed-out Pat's prevent defensive to the thirty-yardline ANYWAY are 60 to 70 percent . Furthermore, in all likelihood, if and when the Colts go those first forty-yards, the Pat's will be that much more gassed-out, making the last thirty (and the toughest ) yards, that much easier. Therefore, do you want to give the Colts a 32 percent chance of being on the thirty or a 60 percent chance of being on the thirty (and the Pat's that much more tired). . . . . . . . Belichick goes against conventional wisdom, but looking at the odds, it shows, BELICHICK IS RIGHT AND CONVENTION IS WRONG -- HE'S A GENIUS.
PS: . . Mozart didn't change his style when the critics complained that he used too many notes in his music. . . . . . . . Don't look for Belichick to change either.